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So one day I was sitting in a meeting about the new global trade regime, 
NAFTA and GATT and the World Trade Organization.  The more I listened, the 
more I began to simmer inside. “This is a huge new system people are 
inventing!’ I said to myself.  ‘They haven’t the slightest idea how it will behave,’ 
myself said back to me. (Meadows,1997, stress added) 
ABSTRACT 
IS researchers are now far more likely to consider using qualitative 
approaches than may have been the case a few years ago.  Publication outlets 
such as JITTA, Information & Organization, and IFIP Working Group 8.2 have 
helped to establish a firm basis for non-quantitative IS research.  One method 
that is gaining increasing popularity is the Grounded Theory Method originated 
by Glaser and Strauss.  There are some profound problems with this approach; 
in particular the unproblematic conceptualization of data, and a level of 
methodological flexibility that can degenerate into methodological indifference 
and result in superficial and ambiguous conclusions. 
This paper argues that the method is not indelibly stamped with these 
failings and inconsistencies; although they are indeed failings, despite the views 
of many users of the method.  If these faults are remedied, however, the method is 
particularly suited to IS research, particularly where it proceeds from an anti-
positivist orientation that sees truth as socially constructed and sustained, and 
where representation is viewed as a distributed, systems phenomenon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Discussion of research 
philosophies and methods within 
IS has increasingly grappled with 
the choice between and relative 
merits of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches.  In part 
this has come about as one aspect 
of the gradual conceptual 
dismantling of the positivist or 
scientistic hegemony. This has 
occurred as part of the agenda to 
increase the visibility of 
intrepretivist approaches; but it 
has also been part of the move to 
promote a more critical research 
orientation.  Some versions of the 
critical programme seek to offer a 
more extensive and profound 
questioning of the entire 
scientistic1 enterprise, usually 
linked to the wider post-
modernist perspective.  This involves a 
comprehensive dismantling of scientism in any 
form, and in some variants denies any sort of 
privileged knowledge claim for science. 
IS has had to accommodate to these 
various trends, and there are distinctions within 
the domain that parallel these wider 
philosophical differences.  To an extent the 
divisions parallel those which distinguish 
different conceptions of the two words 
information and system.  Some see the systems 
approach as an alternative to the scientific one; 
for others it is an orientation that enhances and 
complements the scientific approach both 
methodologically and epistemologically; but 
this is not the key division.  The most profound 
demarcation concerns the ontological status of 
any system:  To what extent it can be said to 
exist.  In his recent summary of the systems 
approach, Ackoff (1999) uses the example of a 
car.  There is the unmistakable sense in which 
the car exists, and so it might be supposed that 
it is similarly obvious that the car-as-system 
                                                 
1 Scientism can be defined as ‘science’s belief in 
itself,’ or as Putnam states, people being ‘too 
realistic about physics and too subjectivistic about 
ethics’ –quoted in Brandom, 2000 
exists.  But whereas the physical extent of the 
car is tangible and measureable, the same 
cannot be said for the car-as-system – for 
instance, does it include the driver? Does it 
include the road on which the car is standing or 
moving?  Now consider the healthcare system 
– another example used by Ackoff.  Where 
does this begin and end?  What does it include 
– and hence exclude?  To what extent does it 
exist? 
Some aspects of this ontological 
concern are raised by Flood in his recent work 
(1999), where he argues that there are two 
central issues for ‘systemic thinking’; 
boundary setting – ‘yielding a viewpoint that is 
both relevant and on a manageable scale’ (p 
70); and ‘who is to judge that any one 
viewpoint is relevant’ (p 70 – stress in the 
original).  A similar sentiment is offered by 
Meadows in the quote at the start of this paper. 
This issue is critical for IS.  Information 
systems exist, but if the system is more than 
the technology – the stuff you can kick – what 
is this ‘more,’ and where is the boundary?  If it 
is not an obvious and tangible boundary, then 
to what extent is its existence dependent on 
certain actors acknowledging its existence?  
There are no simple answers to these 
questions; and the detailed arguments are not 
an issue in this paper.  What is important, 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper should be seen as part of a general
move towards the retrieval of the Grounded Theory
Method [GTM] from its positivist origins, and its
unsystematic use by many researchers who often use
GTM to mask their own - or their discipline's -
methodological confusions. 
In arguing for the importance of approaches such
as GTM, the paper seeks to clarify some central general
methodological issues, which are of particular concern
to IS researchers and practitioners.  It should also be
seen as a contribution to the debate between the
positivists and interpretivists, illustrating how many of
the suppositions of the former fail to engage with
philosophical developments over the past 40 years.  The
reader should be persuaded that using a methodology is
not a matter of choosing an approach from some
methodological supermarket, but something that has far
wider and deeper ramifications. 
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however, is to recognize that the sorts of 
responses IS researchers and theorists might 
give if prompted – or forced - to deal with such 
questions would indicate a great deal about the 
assumptions in their investigations.  Does their 
work emanate from determinist and 
mechanistic foundations?  Do they have a 
tendency towards voluntarist and idealist 
positions?  Are they using structuration or 
structuralist tenets, without consciously 
realizing it? 
Flood’s position is that the strength of 
systems thinking lies in its concern with 
emergent aspects, as opposed to reductionist 
analytic ways of thinking.  His overview of 
some of the key systems thinkers distinguishes 
those who genuinely uphold and contribute to 
this strength from those who continue with a 
deterministic bent within a systems context.  
He singles out Senge’s influential work (1990), 
pointing to Senge’s tendency to develop ‘an 
uncritical choice of boundary and a lack of 
awareness of the ethical nature of boundary 
judgements’ (Flood, 1999, p 71).  Coupled 
with a failure to address the issues of 
‘knowledge-power and social transformation’ 
(p 72), this results in Senge offering a view of 
systems that amounts to a ‘reductionist 
prescription.’  Although Flood does not then 
state that Senge’s work undermines the 
systems approach, he implies this and so offers 
a damaging critique of perhaps the best known 
systems book of the last 20 years. 
Flood finds a far more acceptable and 
rigorous systems perspective in the work of C 
West Churchman (1984), whom he quotes 
approvingly – e.g.  ‘systemic thinking begins 
when you see through the eyes of another’ 
(Flood, 1999, p 69).  Using Churchman’s 
ethically-minded approach together with 
insights from complexity theory, Flood is 
concerned to counter any form of determinism 
- or voluntarism - by centring his arguments 
around three paradoxes. 
‘We will not struggle to manage over things – 
we will manage within the unmanageable. 
We will not battle to organise the totality – we 
will organise within the unorganisable. 
We will not simply know things – but we will 
know of the unknowable.’ (Flood, 1999, p 3) 
Flood wants to stress that ‘systemic 
thinking involves, in the first instance, drawing 
tentative boundaries around stakeholders, 
focusing primarily on clients, and raising 
issues and dilemmas relating to those clients.’ 
(p 7) 
The lesson from this for IS is that our 
research programme has to engage with the 
central ideas around systems.  We have to find 
ways of clarifying and validating our boundary 
settings and the judgements we make 
regarding the relevance of differing 
perspectives. This involves taking account of 
social actors, acting in social contexts as key 
constituting factors – what can be termed 
constituting constituents.  The research agenda 
must follow from this, and research methods 
must not simply aim at counting but at 
accounting (in the sense of giving an account 
of):  Hence the importance of interpretive 
orientations to research, and of qualitative 
research methods, and of the Grounded Theory 
Method. 
THE GROUNDED THEORY METHOD 
There is always some confusion 
regarding the distinction between the grounded 
theory method and grounded theory itself.  A 
grounded theory is the possible outcome of 
using the GT method.  One might use the 
method without producing a grounded theory, 
and there are some who claim to use the 
method as part of an approach that does not 
seek to develop grounded theories.  Since this 
paper is specifically concerned with the 
method, it scrupulously makes correct use of 
the phrase ‘grounded theory method’ (GTM) 
throughout – apart from the title!  This may 
seem somewhat pedantic, but should avoid 
unnecessary confusion – something all too 
common in discussions of GTM. 
There is now a more considered and 
well-argued basis for the use of qualitative 
research methods in IS as can be witnessed 
from recent contributions to many key IS 
journals and conference.  Such contributions 
allow work to be done in the field – literally in 
the case of Klein and Myers’ profound and 
influential paper (1999) – without researchers 
having to justify their research method from 
scratch or grant some level of obeisance to 
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scientism, positivism and quantitative 
methods. 
The Grounded Theory Method (GTM) 
is now widely mentioned in the IS research 
literature.  The method is still closely 
associated with its originators, Barney Glaser 
and Anselm Strauss who introduced and 
developed it in the 1960s.  Until relatively 
recently, the method had something of a 
peripheral, if not pariah, status in many areas; 
but in recent years it has enjoyed a resurgence, 
and there is a growing body of literature that 
attests to its range of application in IS research.  
(See Myers, 2002) 
Glaser and Strauss first published 
studies using the grounded theory method with 
their co-workers in the early 1960s (e.g. Glaser 
& Strauss, 1965; Strauss et al, 1964).  In 1967 
they published an extended exposition of the 
method, and this text of origin has remained 
the central reference point for all those 
working with GTM; having achieved 
something of a classic status in the general 
methods literature.  (Classic in the sense that it 
is always cited, but not always understood or 
followed … or read.) 
The fact that GTM is still so intimately 
linked to its founders might be taken as 
evidence for its failure to move far beyond its 
origins.  Comparison may be made with action 
research, which although owing a good deal to 
the early work of Kurt Lewin now stands on its 
own as a thriving and diverse research 
orientation.  (A recent issue of Information, 
Technology & People was devoted to articles 
on Action Research, and not one of the 
contributions mentioned Lewin.) 
The two originators of GTM came from 
contrasting backgrounds, each with a specific 
influence on the method.  Strauss had worked 
in the Chicago School of social research.  This 
was particularly noted for its stress on 
qualitative research methods, exemplified by 
the work of people such as Robert Park (1968), 
John Dewey (1991), G.H. Mead (1934) and 
Herbert Blumer (1937).  Glaser on the other 
hand had worked at Columbia University with 
Paul Lazarsfeld (1955) who emphasized the 
importance of empirical research, but 
developed innovative ways in using 
quantitative methods.  (See Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, pp 9-10) 
The confluence of these influences was 
brought to bear on the project to offer 
‘strategies for qualitative research’ or 
‘qualitative analysis.’ 
In speaking of qualitative analysis, we are 
referring not to the quantifying of qualitative 
data but rather to a nonmathematical process of 
interpretation, carried out for the purpose of 
discovering concepts and relationships in raw 
data and then organizing these into a 
theoretical explanatory scheme.  (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p11) 
Glaser and Strauss were concerned with 
what they saw as an imbalance between theory 
generation and verification.  ‘Since 
verification has primacy on the current 
sociological scene, the desire to generate 
theory often becomes secondary, if not totally 
lost, in specific researches.’ (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, p2)  They open their book with the 
statement that although obtaining ‘accurate 
facts’ is important, ‘we address ourselves to 
the equally important enterprise of how the 
discovery of theory from data – systematically 
obtained and analyzed in social research – can 
be furthered.  (1967, p1 – stress in original) 
They proposed a ‘general method of 
comparative analysis.’  ‘The basic theme of 
our book is the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research.’ 
(p 2)  This emanated from their concern with 
‘processes of research for generating theory.  
…  [as opposed to] theory generated by logical 
deduction from a priori  assumptions.’ (p 3)  
Although the two originators went their 
separate theoretical ways with regard to GTM 
in the 1980s and 1990s (see Smit & Bryant, 
2000) the essential aspects of GTM as 
specified in most of the key sources do not 
appear to have altered significantly since the 
1967 publication. 
In the GTM literature it is assumed that 
verification was indeed prevalent in 
sociological theorizing at the time, although it 
is sometimes unclear whether this was indeed 
the case.  Whatever the circumstances, Glaser 
and Strauss were intent on establishing a basis 
for qualitative research in the social sciences, 
as opposed to research that relied almost 
exclusively on quantitative – i.e. statistical – 
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methods.  The targets of their criticism were 
not limited to such work, however, since they 
also pointed to the deficiencies in the work of 
more polemical social theorists; and they 
singled out C Wright Mills (1951), whom they 
accused of exhibiting ‘only little theoretical 
control’ (p 5).  This sentiment is reiterated in 
Strauss and Corbin’s work in 1998 – ‘Theory 
derived from data is more likely to resemble 
the (sic) “reality” than is theory derived from 
putting together a series of concepts based on 
experience or solely through speculation (how 
one thinks things ought to work).  Grounded 
theories, because they are drawn from data, are 
likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, 
and provide a meaningful guide to action.’ (p 
12)  (Note the way in which ‘speculation’ is 
seen to involve ‘ought’ rather than ‘might’:  
Also the quotes around the word reality, which 
is used unadorned elsewhere, although the 
authors do say that ‘only God can tell infallible 
humans the “real” nature of reality’ (p 4).  If 
space permitted, it would be interesting to use 
GTM on this statement itself, looking at terms 
such as ‘experience,’ ‘likely,’ and ‘meaningful 
guide to action.’  A cynical observer might 
wonder from which data God emerged.) 
Glaser and Strauss were not then 
seeking to privilege any specific agenda or 
political priorities for social research; but they 
were arguing that a non-quantitative form of 
research could still attain levels of rigour and 
validity that would stand comparison with 
well-established quantitative ones.  At their 
time of writing (1960s), they characterized 
sociological research as heavily biased towards 
validating the grand theories of the 
sociological pantheon.  The legacy of the 
grand social theorists - Marx, Weber, 
Durkheim - had generated a vast array of 
theories that were largely devoid of the 
validation drawn from empirical 
underpinnings.  Thus students were 
encouraged to immerse themselves in these 
theories, and then to ‘test them in small ways’ 
(p 10).  Some exceptions, particularly Robert 
Merton (1957) and Talcott Parsons (1937), had 
broken with this trend, generating their own 
grand theories.  ‘But even these few have 
lacked methods for generating theory from 
data, or at any rate have not written about their 
methods.  They have played “theoretical 
capitalist” to the mass of “proletariat” testers.’  
(p 10) 
Ignoring the convoluted and 
questionable imagery, Glaser and Strauss were 
laying the foundation for GTM on the basis of 
two criticisms of social theory in 1960s.  In the 
first place, they pointed to a gap between 
theory and substantiation, with grand 
theoretical expositions exceeding any 
empirical base; and, second, this hiatus is 
exacerbated by instructors and their 
researchers limiting their endeavours to 
supplying precisely this underpinning. 
GTM was then put forward as a remedy 
to correct these deficiencies by generating new 
theories, but still using the criteria of rigour 
associated with existing – predominantly 
empirical and quantitative - work.  Glaser and 
Strauss were quite explicit about this, indeed 
they stressed that the method must adhere to 
scientific rigour, and that the generating of 
sociological theory is the sole job of 
sociologists.  Professionals and lay people 
‘cannot generate sociological theory from their 
work.  Only sociologists are trained to want it, 
to look for it, and to generate it.’ (pp 6-7). 
This coincides with their position 
regarding the ‘interrelated jobs of theory in 
sociology’ (p 3) - ‘(1) to enable prediction and 
explanation of behaviour; (2) to be useful in 
theoretical advance in sociology; (3) to be 
usable in practical applications – prediction 
and explanation should be able to give the 
practitioner understanding and some control of 
situations; (4) to provide a perspective on 
behaviour – a stance to be taken toward data; 
and (5) to guide and provide a style for 
research on particular areas of behaviour’ 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p 3). 
All of these five aspects would be 
readily acceptable to even the most 
‘verificationist,’ empirical sociologist.  In fact 
the idea that research should yield a basis for 
prediction and control based on study of data is 
a fairly succinct summary of a scientistic or 
positivist position. 
This early statement of the method can 
be read as an argument that qualitative 
methods – in particular their own ‘general 
method of comparative analysis’ – can be as 
rigorous as quantitative ones.  As a 
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consequence, research developed using GTM 
can make the same knowledge claims as those 
made by research findings generated by more 
traditional - verified - quantitative methods.  It 
is, therefore, not surprising to see that Glaser 
later stated that ‘Grounded Theory does not 
represent a change in philosophy and scientific 
thought’ (1998, p 44).  The principles behind 
GTM, and its characterization of scientific 
discovery are completely in tune with the 
standard positivist orthodoxy of the 1960s.  
This was perhaps readily understandable in 
1967, when their work first appeared; but it is 
hardly credible to maintain such a view in the 
1980s and 1990s without at least engaging 
with critiques of positivism. 
GROUNDED THEORY METHOD AND 
POSITIVISM 
A study of the work of Glaser and 
Strauss, and others quoted and cited in the 
central texts on GTM reveals an almost 
complete silence about any of the key 
developments in epistemology and philosophy 
of science in the last 30 years.  One searches in 
vain for a reference to positivism or 
interpretivism, let alone any substantive 
discussion of Thomas Kuhn (1996), Karl 
Popper (1968), and the developing 
philosophical debates about their work. 
Even now, these failings have not really 
been addressed in the context of GTM.  Haig 
(1995) has pointed out that the method has 
been accused of a ‘naïve Baconian 
inductivism,’ although he offers no 
characterization of what this might be, nor 
does he specify any sources of this criticism.  
The problematic nature of the process of 
deriving general law-like statements from 
repeated observations – i.e. induction, 
presumably what Haig means by ‘inductivism’ 
- is not explained.  Popper’s work in the 1960s, 
and Kuhn’s in the 1970s are only the most 
obvious and well cited examples of critiques of 
induction.  Moreover, Haig reiterates the point 
that Glaser and Strauss wished to see GTM as 
a ‘general theory of scientific method,’ 
meeting ‘the accepted canons for doing good 
science.’  Haig does not see these factors as 
problematic, simply stating that ‘these 
methodological notions are not to be 
understood in a positivist sense.’  Although he 
fails to point out why not; but his paper does at 
least hint at some unease within the GTM fold 
about its philosophical bases. 
Positivism is founded on the assertion 
that knowledge of reality is only possible 
through observations; the ‘rule of 
phenomenalism,’ which asserts that experience 
provides the unique basis for knowledge.  
Furthermore these observations can and must 
be value-neutral, since judgements of value 
have no empirical content.  Scientific 
knowledge is developed by gathering together 
repeated observations, so that general law-like 
generalizations can be made.  This archetype 
of what constitutes valid knowledge should 
apply not only to the natural sciences, but to all 
other modes of enquiry. 
Certainly there are some statements in 
the ‘standard’ GTM literature (attributable to 
Glaser and Strauss singly and collectively) that 
stress that the researcher’s own views do have 
some impact on the research process.  But 
there is a far stronger, clearer and consistent 
thread from the late 1960s to the present that is 
readily identifiable with the characteristics 
mentioned above.  The ‘rule of 
phenomenalism’ is central, and intimately 
linked to the key role that is played by ‘data’ in 
all GTM writings.  Glaser and Strauss 
continually refer to the theory being ‘grounded 
in the data’; this is part of the mantra of the 
grounded theorist, and like a mantra it is 
continually chanted, but rarely questioned or 
examined.  A few examples from early and late 
GTM publications will serve as illustrations. 
– ‘[t]he basic theme in our book is the 
discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social 
research’ (G&S, 1976, p 2); 
– ‘Theory based on data can usually not be 
completely refuted by more data or 
replaced by another theory.  Since it is too 
intimately linked to data, it is destined to 
last despite its inevitable modification and 
reformulation.’ (G&S, 1967, p 4); 
– ‘… the generation of theory from such 
insights [sources other than data] must then 
be brought into relation to the data, or there 
is great danger that theory and empirical 
world will mismatch.’ (G&S, 1967, p 6); 
– ‘The first step in gaining theoretical 
sensitivity is to enter the research setting 
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with as few predetermined ideas as possible 
– especially logically deducted (sic), a prior 
(sic) hypotheses.  In this posture, the 
analyst is able to remain sensitive to the 
data by being able to record events and 
detect happenings without first having them 
filtered through and squared with pre-
existing hypotheses and biases.’ (Glaser, 
1978, pp 2-3); 
– ‘A theory must be readily modifiable, 
based on ever-emerging notions from more 
data.’ Glaser, 1978, p 4); 
– ‘A researcher does not begin a project with 
a preconceived theory in mind (unless his 
or her purpose is to elaborate and extend 
existing theory).  Rather, the researcher 
begins with an area of study and allows the 
theory to emerge from the data.  (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p 12); 
– ‘Creativity manifests itself in the ability of 
researchers to aptly name categories, ask 
stimulating questions, make comparisons, 
and extract an innovative, integrated, 
realistic scheme from masses of 
unorganized, raw data.’ (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998, p 13) 
Taken together this demonstrates a 
consistently positivist strand running through 
the GTM literature from the 1960s to the 
present.  Data is seen as an unexceptional 
category; it is simply what is observed.  
Conclusions are based on accreting multiple 
observations, and then using these as the basis 
for deriving general, law-like statements - i.e. 
induction - in the process of theory generation.  
This may have been conceptually 
unremarkable in the 1960s; but given the 
developments in epistemology and philosophy 
of science since then, it is surprising that there 
has not been some extended justification 
particularly of the use of the concept of ‘data’ 
in the GTM literature in the last 30 years. 
Glaser did later acknowledge that GTM 
is only ‘one theory on where theory may 
profitably come from and one method of how 
to obtain it’ (1978, p 3).  This should not, 
however, detract from the inconsistencies 
within the method itself, and its general failure 
to engage in self-reflection, applying GTM to 
its own concepts and categories.  For instance 
it still begs the question from which set of data 
does the theory about the origins of theory 
emerge?   (NB – Also it is unclear what the ‘it’ 
refers to at the end of the quoted section – it 
could be ‘theory,’ or ‘data.’) 
Haig (1995) does try to engage with 
these issues in distinguishing between data and 
phenomena – ‘it is typically phenomena, not 
data, that our theories are constructed to 
explain and predict.  … grounded theories 
should be taken as grounded in phenomena, 
not data.’  Haig stresses that these 
‘phenomena’ comprise a ‘varied ontological 
bag,’ and in general they are ‘not observable.’  
But he fails to sustain his argument, and 
eventually undermines it completely with 
statements such as ‘some observations 
(phenomena) are encountered which are 
surprising,’ and ‘we come to notice that those 
observations (phenomena)’ … .  So are 
phenomena observable or not?  If they are, 
how are they distinct from data? 
In the absence of any sustained critique 
from within GTM that defends the basic 
precepts from being labelled positivist and 
scientistic, one can only turn to the consistent 
and repeated aspects of the method itself.  
Early and late writings on GTM stress that the 
method should give rise to theories – grounded 
theories - that meet certain criteria.  They 
should have fit and relevance, they must work 
and be readily modifiable (Glaser, 1978, p 4).  
By fit, Glaser means that the categories of the 
theory must fit the data – whatever that might 
mean.  ‘Since most of the categories of 
grounded theory are generated directly from 
the data, the criteria (sic) of fit is automatically 
met’ (p 4 – note the use of ‘most’ in this 
sentence). 
When a grounded theory works it 
means that the theory can ‘explain what 
happened, predict what will happen, and 
interpret what is happening in the area of 
substantive or formal inquiry’ (Glaser, 1978, p 
4).  Glaser maintains that this is achieved 
through determining what is going on in the 
area of inquiry through systematic research.  A 
theory will therefore work if its categories fit 
and if it is relevant to the ‘action of the area’ 
(Glaser, 1978, p 5). 
In terms of the characterization of 
positivism given above, and on the basis of the 
extracts quoted, GTM appears indelibly 
Antony Bryant 
 32
positivist.  The entire GTM endeavour seems 
to be founded on phenomenalism, guided by 
induction.  The only possible conclusion that 
can be made from all this is that GTM 
developed from an epistemological position 
that was positivist, and that it has failed to 
justify or to shake off this inheritance.  What 
the remainder of this paper will argue, 
however, is that this dubious legacy can be 
discarded, re-aligning the method as a crucial 
device for IS research and theoretical 
development. 
In their later writings Glaser and 
Strauss parted company, with a good deal of 
acrimony.  (See Smit & Bryant, 2000, for a 
more detailed account of these developments.)  
Without going into the intricacies of the 
dispute, the differences that emerged between 
Glaser and Strauss are symptomatic of the 
uneasy alliance of assumptions that lie at the 
heart of GTM:  In particular the tension 
between the claims bound up with scientific 
status and empirical reality, and the attention 
to detail, context and meaning.  This is not to 
attenuate the criticism of the method for its 
scientism and positivism, but it is to allow that 
there are some aspects of the method that do 
begin to take a more interpretive and dialogical 
view of the research process and any resulting 
knowledge claims.  It is this aspect that is 
critical to IS, as will be explained later. 
METHODOLOGICAL INADEQUACIES 
OF GTM 
The weaknesses of GTM are not 
confined to the philosophical, they extend to 
the methodological.  One of the reasons that 
GTM continues to be held at arm’s length in 
some research communities is that all too often 
it is an excuse for evading methodological 
issues.  People who claim to be using GTM 
often use this as a way of disguising their 
methodological incompetence or fragility – 
particularly if they lack clear objectives or 
have poorly developed research ideas. 
Babchuk (1996) hints at this when 
contrasting Glaser’s ‘laissez-faire’ approach 
with Strauss’ detailed procedural minutiae.  In 
his survey of 15 years of publications in the 
Adult Education field, he notes 
euphemistically that GTM has been used as an 
‘umbrella term’ by a large number of 
researchers – by which he implies that they use 
the term to mean more or less anything they 
want.  Babchuk offers examples that range 
from use of one aspect of GTM (constant 
comparison), through use of the method as one 
of several employed on a project, to careful 
efforts to follow the ‘full complement of rules 
and dictates.’  From which he concludes that 
‘[O]ne begins to wonder if this diverse 
interpretation of grounded theory procedures is 
representative of the ingenuity of educators 
and their research designs or simply confusion 
over method.’  He is equivocal in regard to this 
flexibility of GTM; is it a source of strength or 
weakness?  (He concludes that the method is 
particularly suited to Adult Education - make 
of that what you will.)  Robrecht (1995) arrives 
at a similar conclusion in her review of the use 
of GTM in management literature.  She found 
that some authors cite Glaser and Strauss, but 
often with little to indicate that the method has 
been followed.  At best this amounts to a 
‘selective rewriting’ of GTM; and at worst, 
mention of GTM is used as a way of masking 
‘an anything goes approach’ that is 
methodologically arbitrary and ultimately 
indefensible. 
A large number of those professing to 
use GTM exhibit this laxity of interpretation of 
the method, often accompanied by a 
philosophical naiveté and confusion similar to 
that exhibited by Glaser and Strauss 
themselves.  An example of this is provided in 
the paper by De Vreede et al (1999), and it is 
worth analyzing it in some detail.  Their paper, 
published in a reputable journal, uses GTM in 
the context of a cross-cultural field study of 
group support systems [GSS].  The points that 
follow are not meant in any way to detract 
from the content and import of the paper.  On 
the contrary, the paper illustrates the key point 
of the present argument that despite the 
weaknesses and evasions of GTM, the method 
is powerful and often indispensable for 
precisely this sort of investigation. 
In the abstract the authors note that the 
study used a ‘grounded theory approach … to 
collect and analyze data.’  ‘From the data 
emerged a model of GSS acceptance in the 
cultures investigated that extends the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM).’  This 
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is problematic in GTM terms since Glaser & 
Strauss (1967) explicitly distinguished 
between ‘grounded generating of theory’ and 
‘grounded modifying of theory’ (1967, p 2 
footnote, stress added).  Strauss and Corbin 
some 30 years later do seem to allow 
modification, and they note that ‘a researcher 
might have some preconceived theory in mind 
… [if the] purpose is to elaborate and extend 
existing theory’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p 
12). In this case, however, they stress that the 
theory does not emerge from the data.  Glaser 
tackles the same issue when he discusses 
‘modifiability’ (1978). 
Despite this, the distinction between 
modifying a theory (grounded or not) and 
developing an existing theory remains an 
enigma.  Neither category is ever analyzed in 
the GTM literature.  De Vreede et al can 
hardly be held accountable for this confusion, 
since it lies at the heart of ‘classic’ GTM 
writings; but it does exemplify a group of 
keenly analytic researchers failing to apply 
insights to their own tools. 
De Vreede et al offer their version of 
the mantra of GTM – ‘This approach [GTM] 
aims to develop inductively derived grounded 
theories about a phenomenon.  A grounded 
theory is not built a priori; rather, it emerges 
during study as data collection, analysis, and 
theory development occur in parallel.’ (1999, p 
205)  What they mean by ‘in parallel’ is not 
clear; but in any case they almost immediately 
undermine the statement about emergence by 
noting that ‘data-collection activities may be 
guided by relevant existing theories’ (p 206). 
They try to offer some explanation and 
justification for what they mean by being 
‘guided by… relevant existing theories,’ 
arguing that it might be thought that ‘our data-
collection efforts could have been 
prestructured using research domain relevant 
theories such as the cultural theories of 
Hofstede or the TAM.’  Given that they are 
obviously well aware of such theories, the 
authors reassure their readers that ‘[W]e 
decided not to do so in order to avoid a 
standard way of thinking about the phenomena 
observed.’  How they managed this feat of 
cognitive evasion is not clear, but their 
imagery is revealing as they develop the point 
– ‘Having too much a priori theoretical 
guidance can block a researcher from seeing 
what is and is not really significant.’ 
Here is a succinctly positivist view of 
cognition.  Other theories, known to the 
observer can simply be discarded, and 
assumptions can be reduced or perhaps 
dispensed with altogether.  The phenomena 
can be observed from a totally neutral position 
by a dispassionate and passive observer.  
Cognitive reservoirs of previous experience 
and knowledge can be dammed, blocked or 
diverted - a good example of what Michael 
Reddy terms the conduit metaphor (see Reddy, 
1993 and Bryant, 2001).  The flow of ‘raw 
data’ can be turned on and off like a tap; and 
categories and theory emerge from this neutral, 
passive observational practice – ‘we closely 
examined all collected data, broke them into 
discrete parts, and labeled these parts.’ 
As a statement of GTM this is, 
unfortunately, unexceptional; as a statement 
about observation and theoretical insight it is 
naïve and highly misleading.  Coupled with the 
idea that theory can be ‘inductively derived,’ it 
evades far too many issues and questions that 
have been central to philosophy of science and 
epistemology for at least the past 30 years.  De 
Vreede et al give no explanation for what 
counts as ‘data’ in their work.  They see no 
problem with ‘induction,’ despite the fact that 
it has been largely discredited in such a 
simplistic form.  They imply that their 
observational role is largely passive, yet fail to 
explain how the data can be broken into 
‘discrete parts’ and how ‘categories could be 
identified’ other than through conscious 
actions of the researchers themselves.2 
                                                 
2 An earlier version of this paper (Bryant, 2002) was 
presented at HICSS35; and by chance one of the 
reviewers was de Vreede.  Amongst his comments, 
he said that the original version of the paper made 
no mention of TAM, but that ‘[T]o get through the 
process’ (i.e.  to get published) they had to link 
TAM to their findings - ‘we struggled quite a bit.’  
Another reviewer made the point that although 
GTM may be imbued with the positivism of the 
1960s, ‘many qualitative researchers in IS have to 
conduct and publish their research within the 
context of a positivist orthodoxy in North America 
… and thus, the scientific (or perhaps scientistic) 
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All of this raises a number of questions, 
without having to delve deeply into the 
philosophical intricacies involved.  ‘How do 
categories emerge from passive observation of 
data?’; ‘Why are certain things held to be 
similar, and others held to be different?’; ‘Are 
such ideas historically or culturally 
distinctive?’  As soon as one does confront 
these queries, however, the limitations of GTM 
as expressed by many of its proponents 
become apparent.  This is not to say that the 
philosophical bases of GTM ideas themselves 
are wrong – although I think that they are 
inadequate at best:  But it is to point out that 
the assumptions about cognition and 
knowledge need extensive justification, and 
this is almost totally lacking in the GTM 
literature. 
WHY BOTHER WITH GTM? 
Given the foregoing discussion, why 
not simply jettison GTM in its entirety?  The 
weaknesses of GTM are evident.  The key 
statements about the method are steeped in a 
scientism that was already largely undermined 
in philosophical terms in the 1970s and 1980s.  
(Although it has not been undermined in 
practical terms, but that is another matter.)  
Ideas about ‘data,’ the ‘emergence of theory,’ 
and the essentially passive stance of the 
researcher to the research context and research 
resources are just not tenable.  At the very least 
they have to be clarified and justified.  
Furthermore the entire assumptions about 
representation and discovery are at best 
questionable, and at worst unfounded and 
naïve. 
But the basic principles about the 
conduct of research guided by GTM are 
another matter altogether.  Here we have an 
extremely well-developed programme for 
conducting qualitative research.  Many of the 
examples of actual research that Glaser and 
Strauss – in concert and separately - and others 
offer are exemplars of good qualitative 
                                                                
language of GTM is VERY valuable to them.’  
Perhaps this also explains the attraction of GTM for 
IS researchers in the 1990s and 2000s; although it 
does put IS some 30-40 years behind other 
disciplines. 
research practice.  In other words we need to 
pay attention to what they do, rather than 
what they say they do.  If researchers paid 
more attention to the substantive studies of 
Glaser, Strauss and their colleagues (Strauss et 
al, 1964; Glaser & Strauss, 1965), and less to 
their lengthy methodological disquisitions, 
perhaps the value of GTM would be more 
readily apparent. 
An illustration of the value of GTM in 
the IS literature is provided by Wanda 
Orlikowski’s article on CASE tools (1993).  
She uses GTM ‘because it allows a focus on 
contextual and processual elements as well as 
the action of key players associated with 
organizational change.’  Orlikowski offers a 
justification of GTM that refers to the 
secondary literature far more than the primary 
Glaser and/or Strauss sources.  She argues that 
GTM has three key characteristics, it is 
‘inductive, contextual, and processual,’ and 
this makes GTM ‘fit with the interpretive 
rather than the positivist orientation.’  This 
conclusion is questionable unless Orlikowski 
has a very unusual definition of ‘inductive.’  
However, although she does offer some of the 
standard GTM mantra – ‘concepts that are 
suggested by the data,’ etc.  – her use of the 
GTM approach seems to be one of ‘constant 
comparative analysis,’ using two case studies. 
What distinguishes the paper (winner of 
MIS Quarterly ‘Best Paper’ for 1993) is its 
extensive detail, and the ways in which the 
differing accounts that she develops of the two 
case studies illustrate general and specific 
aspects of the respective experiences of CASE 
tool introduction.  Her conclusions point to the 
importance for IS practice of consideration of 
people’s motives, beliefs and orientations in 
regard to their work environment and change 
in routines and expectations.  Anyone reading 
the paper could not help but be impressed by 
the detail and analysis, yet one might wonder 
what makes the study an example of 
developing a ‘grounded theory.’ 
One aspect of Orlikowski’s paper is the 
way in which she ‘grounds’ her own use of 
GTM.  She refers to Glaser & Strauss (1967), 
but not to any of their other writings; and she 
refers extensively to several papers by Turner.  
A study of Turner’s 1983 paper, together with 
Orlikowski’s, and Locke’s (1996) strengthens 
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the view that the method underlying GTM 
does indeed offer a distinctive and important 
basis for research.  This is not simply restricted 
to sociology, as Glaser and Strauss first 
thought, but applicable to many other forms of 
research, and in particular to anything focused 
on people’s actions and interpretations in 
organizational and other social contexts. 
If the tendentious and misleading 
philosophical underpinnings of GTM are swept 
aside, the strengths of the approach can 
become apparent.  To some extent, what the 
method highlights is a series of activities and 
considerations that ought to be primary for any 
form of research involving people.  Strauss and 
Corbin offer a list of the ‘characteristics of a 
grounded theorist’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p 
7) – the ability to step back and critically 
analyze situations, recognition of the tendency 
toward bias, and the ability to think abstractly.  
Coupled with the ability to be flexible and 
open to helpful criticism; sensitivity to the 
words and actions of respondents; and a sense 
of absorption and devotion to the work 
process. 
These are hardly specific to GTM, and 
would be highly regarded qualities in most 
researchers.  What distinguishes GTM, 
however, is its insistence on engaging with the 
actors and their contexts; Turner offers a useful 
summation as follows; 
This approach to qualitative data promotes the 
development of theoretical accounts which 
conform closely to the situations being 
observed, so that the theory is likely to be 
intelligible to and usable by those in the 
situations observed, and is open to comment 
and correction by them.  … The approach also 
directs the researcher immediately to the 
creative core of the research process and 
facilitates the direct application of both the 
intellect and the imagination to the demanding 
process of interpreting qualitative research 
data.  It is worth noting that the quality of the 
final product arising from this kind of work is 
more directly dependent upon the quality of the 
research worker’s understanding of the 
phenomena under observation than is the case 
with many other approaches to research.  
(Turner, 1983, pp 334-5, stress added) 
Turner’s characterization of GTM is far 
more persuasive than the refrain of ‘theory 
emerging from the data.’  Here we see research 
as a process of engagement with actors-in-
contexts; with the corollary that the researcher 
is also an actor-in-context(s) - an active, 
participating observer who must be wary of 
cognitive and theoretical arrogance.  This 
implies that the process of research might not 
be one of discovering or establishing truth, but 
rather concerned with developing 
understanding and adequate models for 
specified purposes.  Charmaz (2000) in her 
recent discussion of GTM makes many similar 
points, and concludes that ‘we can adopt 
grounded theory strategies without embracing 
the positivist leanings of earlier proponents of 
grounded theory’ (p 510). 
The problem with GTM is that the 
method is offered in terms of both a 
qualitative, interpretive one, and a ‘good, 
scientific’ one.  It is important that qualitative 
research should strive to be rigorous, but 
unfortunately the latter aspect of GTM has 
‘emerged’ rather more strongly than the 
former, and it has done so in the guise of an 
idiosyncratic caricature of rigour, expressed  in 
scientistic terms.  GTM writings are still 
predominantly couched in terms of an expert 
researcher dispassionately investigating a 
research domain.  This obscures the point that 
research is an active engagement undertaken 
by researchers with their own assumptions, 
cultural backgrounds and predilections; and it 
is better to admit this and then seek to 
explicate the process as one of dialogue rather 
than as some form of dispassionate and 
detached analysis.  The sections in italics in the 
extract from Turner exemplify the sources of 
strength and value in GTM. 
In many regards it is surprising that 
what can be termed the hermeneutic or 
interpretive trend in GTM did not come to 
dominate the approach.  Strauss came from a 
background influenced by symbolic 
interactionism, derived from the work of G.H. 
Mead and John Dewey.  As Robrecht (1995) 
notes, the symbolic interactionist approach was 
founded on three premises; the actions of 
human beings are based on meanings that 
actors invoke as appropriate; meanings are 
derived from social interaction with others; 
meanings are dealt with/modified by people 
through interpretation and social experience.  
Yet these bases seem to have been effaced in 
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favour of claims for the method to be ‘good 
science,’ a tendency that was later exacerbated 
by the dispute between Glaser and Strauss.  
(Although Glaser is certainly justified in his 
criticism that Strauss & Corbin have sought to 
codify or systematize GTM to such an extent 
that it could be classified as one of the methods 
that were the main target of Glaser & Strauss 
in 1967.) 
GTM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH 
METHOD FOR IS 
Where then does this leave the GTM 
approach?  Why is it still an important 
consideration for IS research?  Flood’s critique 
of Senge, and his lauding of Churchman, are 
based on the importance he gives to boundary 
setting and judgement of relevance.  These, 
together with the issue of ontological status 
(the sense in which something actually exists), 
underline the importance of people’s 
perceptions in research activities.  Research 
issues exist in the sense that some group of 
people agree on identifying and validating a 
particular topic – and thus identifying a 
boundary.  Once these issues come to 
researchers’ attention, it becomes critical that 
some effort is expended in clarifying the nature 
of the topic, its boundaries, and its priorities.  
Consideration of such issues will necessitate 
attention being paid to the ontological bases of 
the topic.  If the topic involves people, 
however, a further aspect of perception is 
involved, since the actors themselves will have 
perceptions that have to be taken into account; 
so attention must be given to the accounts of 
those involved:  The constituting constituents. 
GTM offers a range of methods, 
techniques and exemplars of ways in which 
researchers can ensure that they begin to take 
account of actors’ perceptions and actions.  
Baszanger & Dodier (1997) capture this in 
their discussion of ethnographic approaches, 
which they characterize as empirical; non-
codified, remaining open, and grounded in 
observed phenomena.  They discuss each of 
these separately, but in general their position 
can be summarized by their statement that –  
[T]he principle of openness to what cannot a 
priori be pre-codified results in the basic 
tension underlying in situ studies.  The 
flexibility required by this openness conflicts 
with the need to maintain at least a minimum 
of method in the conduct of the study, that is, a 
certain guide for the behaviour both of the 
fieldworker and the people observed. (p 9, 
stress added) 
Here is a far more acute and 
philosophically defensible basis for GTM – 
and kindred ethnographic approaches.  
Baszanger & Dodier note that such approaches 
are prone to a methodological problem 
whereby ‘the moment at which data are 
integrated into a whole occurs at an unknown, 
almost mysterious point of the process’ (p 14).  
This is a more honest view than that of theories 
emerging from the data.  Yet they are firm in 
their conviction that methods such as GTM – 
together with the earlier Chicago tradition, and 
sociological pragmatics – offer a profound 
basis for research that ‘is no longer concerned 
with the search for references shared by actors 
… [but one which] aims to take stock of the 
dynamic relationship between the real 
activities of individuals within the framework 
of complex, normative references which are 
related to the situation and are not unified’ (p 
17). 
They use Glaser and Strauss’ definition 
of GTM, a method of ‘constant comparison 
…consisting of accumulating a series of 
individual cases, of analyzing them as a 
combination between different logics of action 
that coexist not only in the field under 
consideration, but even within these 
individuals or during their encounters’ (p 17).  
The aim of such methods is generalization 
rather than totalization, with the objective 
being to produce ‘a combinative inventory of 
possible situations.’  (Note the tentative view 
of the nature of research and knowledge.) 
This interpretation of GTM, by two 
French writers, seems far clearer and more 
defensible than those offered even by Glaser 
and Strauss themselves.  It echoes Charmaz’ 
argument and reinforces Turner’s 
interpretation of GTM that stresses that the 
outcome of research has to be ‘understandable 
and enlightening to individuals who have some 
familiarity with the social phenomena under 
investigation, either as participants or as lay 
observers.’  This can be achieved using GTM 
since it treats the accounts of members 
painstakingly and seriously, hence the 
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importance that all GTM research gives to the 
activity of coding:  Something that Glaser and 
Strauss agree on, despite any of their mutual 
misgivings. 
The methods and tools outlined by 
Glaser and Strauss provide guidance for 
researchers who seek to follow Churchman’s 
precept that ‘systemic thinking begins when 
you see through the eyes of another.’  Many 
other researchers who have used GTM come to 
a similar conclusion in advocating GTM as an 
important part of a collaborative approach 
involving conceptualization from both the 
informant’s and researcher’s perspectives – 
e.g. Fitzgerald & Howcroft, 1998, Ellis, 1993, 
Bartlett et al, 1997. 
The real mystery about GTM is why 
these aspects of the method have remained 
subjugated to those evoked by the mantra of 
‘theory emerging from the data’; and why the 
early statement that sociological theory is the 
exclusive estate of sociologists has remained 
largely unchallenged in the GTM literature.  
To date GTM has been widely misused; often 
as a catch-all that can be evoked as a 
justification for methodological inadequacies, 
or a qualitative loin-cloth to fool the 
gatekeepers of the academies.  But this should 
not be allowed to detract from its strengths, 
and in particular its value for IS research. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why GTM 
has had a particularly troubled relationship 
with IS practice and research is that issues 
around ‘data,’ and representation have proved 
enormously troublesome within the IS domain.  
The debates often revolve around the 
relationships between terms such as ‘data,’ 
‘information,’ and more recently, ‘knowledge,’ 
now often joined by ‘insight’ and ‘wisdom.’  
Many of those contributing to these 
discussions base their ideas on what has been 
termed the ‘chemical engineering’ model 
where data is the raw material from which 
information is extracted.  This is a restatement 
of phenomenalism, since it implies that data 
exists waiting to be captured and processed.  If 
there is any rationale for continuing to use the 
term data, then it is only in the sense of 
‘something that is stored in objects’ - both 
inanimate and animate.  Books, records, 
accounts, computer systems, CDs, disks and 
the like can be thought of as ‘containing data’; 
but then so too do trees, plants, rocks, animals 
and people. Human beings do not, however, 
extract information from this raw material.  As 
soon as humans turn their attention to any 
object, we are immediately in the realm of 
meaning.  If data can be said to exist at all, 
data is the stuff of which by definition human 
beings are unaware. 
People cannot engage directly in 
anything to do with data.  Scanning a book into 
a computer is a data process; someone trying 
to read it - and make sense of it - involves 
information; because it inevitably involves 
meaning.  Carbon-based entities are 
information-oriented; silicon-based ones are 
data-oriented.  Information comes about 
because animate entities - particularly human 
beings - construct meaning and exchange 
ideas in order to exist as social beings and 
interact.  Meaning construction is a key 
activity in all human processes.  GTM, 
stripped of its scientistic veneer, is oriented 
precisely towards this aspect of existence, and 
that is why it is such an important device for IS 
practise. 
A large amount of misunderstanding 
about the nature of the process of constructing 
meaning emanates from the metaphorical 
imagery in which such discussions are 
couched.  This has been explained elsewhere, 
particularly by Schön (1993) and Reddy 
(1993); and has been specifically applied to the 
field of information systems and software 
engineering (Bryant, 2000 and 2001). 
The dominance of what Reddy terms 
the conduit metaphor, leads to the presumption 
that information flows around a system from 
source to target; from sender to receiver.  
(Exemplified by De Vreede et al implying that 
cognition is something that can be turned off 
and on like a tap.) 
(1) ‘language functions like a conduit, 
transferring thoughts bodily from one person to 
another; (2) in writing and speaking, people 
insert their thoughts or feelings in the words; 
(3) words accomplish the transfer by 
containing the thoughts or feelings and 
conveying them to others; and (4) in listening 
or reading, people extract the thoughts and 
feelings once again from the words.’ (Reddy, 
1993) 
Antony Bryant 
 38
This allocates primacy to the action of 
sending, and implies that receiving is a 
relatively passive process, at the most calling 
upon the repertoire of actions required 
‘merely’ for extracting or decoding.  This 
metaphor also obscures the point that what is 
sent is a series of signals; information is 
created in devising the message and in 
interpreting it.  Reddy distinguishes between 
the signals and the selection processes that 
occur at both ends of the process.  The thing 
that is sent is not the message but the signal; 
the message is what the sender wanted to 
communicate, and which may or may not 
correspond to the message derived by the 
receiver.  Sending and receiving each require 
action and interpretation.  This also applies to 
observation in the sense that the observer has 
to put effort into interpreting what is seen; 
nothing emerges without this activity. 
Cilliers distinguishes between the 
‘mentalist’ or ‘functionalist’ view of 
representation, and the ‘connectionist’ 
approach that treats representation as 
distributed (Cilliers, 1998, chapter 5).  He 
refers to the work of Hilary Putnam since 
Putnam’s early work provides the classic 
account of mentalism, while his later work 
offers a trenchant critique of his earlier 
position.  Putnam specifically criticizes 
mentalism, describing it as ‘the latest form 
taken by a more general tendency … to think 
of concepts as scientifically describable 
(“psychologically real”) entities in the mind or 
brain’ (quoted in Cilliers, p 65).  Mentalism is 
fallacious since meaning is ‘holistic,’ ‘part of a 
normative notion,’ ‘dependent on 
environment,’ and, Cilliers adds, ‘historical.’  
Mentalism is based on a view of cognition as a 
process of ‘extraction’ of discrete items of 
data:  Connectionism assumes that meaning is 
a property of a network of relationships, where 
the links between the nodes are as important as 
the nodes themselves. 
Without going in to the details of 
Putnam’s and Cilliers’ respective positions, the 
general connectionist account severely 
undermines those who see cognition as a 
passive gathering of discrete ‘data,’ that can be 
accumulated and later classified into 
categories.  It also impacts on the related 
position that characterizes communication as 
an unmediated transfer of these data packets.  
Judgements are involved in deciding what 
constitutes ‘data,’ what constitutes ‘similarity,’ 
how categories and distinctions arise and are 
sustained.  Furthermore, communication has to 
be treated as an active process, requiring effort 
by all involved. 
As an example, consider the current 
trend in the field of IS and elsewhere to focus 
on knowledge and knowledge management.  
For Davenport and Prusak knowledge is 
defined as ‘a fluid mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert 
insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences 
and information’ (1998, p 5).   Meehan (1999) 
in his brief survey of definitions of knowledge 
in the knowledge management literature, 
argues that definitions like Davenport and 
Prusak’s are heavily slanted towards a 
‘technical-rational’ view.  Thus although 
Davenport and Prusak offer an initial 
definition of knowledge as a ‘fluid mix,’ a few 
pages after this, they state that ‘[N]ot only can 
it [knowledge] judge new situations and 
information in the light of what is already 
known, it judges and refines itself in responses 
to new situations and information’ (p 11, 
quoted by Meehan, p 5, his stress added).  
Meehan rightly points to this as an example of 
knowledge as a disembodied object; and most 
definitely not a socially-constructed, human-
centred process. 
A similar objectification and 
disembodiment can be found in regard to the 
practices involved in developing information 
systems, particularly in specifying system 
requirements, where we often talk about 
‘requirements capture,’ and use phrases such 
as ‘get those requirements down on paper 
before we lose them,’ or ‘we’ve been trying to 
pin down that idea for ages.’  (For a fuller 
account of this see Bryant, 2001.) 
This tendency to objectify is not unique 
to IS.  Indeed elsewhere I have argued that 
people seem generally and inherently drawn 
towards object abstractions rather than process 
ones – a tendency that can be referred to as 
thingking (Bryant, 2000).  It is however, 
particularly acute as an issue for IS where 
there is a tendency to move from initial 
statements that afford significance to human 
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processes to methods and conclusions that are 
anything but human-centred and process-
based. 
IS researchers have to engage with 
issues concerned with the socially constructed 
nature of knowledge, adequacy of method, 
rigour of procedures, and extensibility of 
findings.  GTM – in its remedied form – 
provides a useful barrier to such tendencies:  
Particularly if it keeps researchers anchored in 
the three premises that Robrecht traces from 
the interactionist perspective:  Human actions 
are based on meanings that actors invoke as 
appropriate; meanings are derived from social 
interaction with others; meanings are dealt 
with/modified by people through interpretation 
and social experience. 
Such postulates can provide a basis for 
undermining any inclination towards object-
centred, mechanistic and technicist thinking.  
Furthermore if IS researchers take on board the 
insights of Turner, Charmaz, and others, then 
application of GTM can be seen to support 
moves that derive from ideas evoked by terms 
such as the ‘social construction of reality’ 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1971) and 
‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1981).  Here, in 
contrast to mechanistic and technical-rational 
views of information and knowledge, meaning 
is characterized as something that is 
continually constructed by social actors.  
Giddens’  theory of structuration distinguishes 
between system and structure.  Social systems 
are ‘composed of patterns of relationships 
between actors or collectivities reproduced 
across time and space’ (p 26); whereas 
structures ‘have only a virtual existence.’  This 
existence has a dual nature - the duality of 
structure - in the sense that the structure ‘is 
both the medium and the outcome of the 
practices which constitute social systems’ (p 
27).  This is not to say that social actors do this 
in an arbitrary fashion:  On the contrary we 
continually test and seek to confirm our own 
sets of meanings. 
Meaning construction is a social 
activity, not an individual one.  For the most 
part we do this all the time, without realizing 
that we are doing so.  We only become 
conscious that we are doing this if someone 
draws our attention to it - as I am doing here:  
Or if something ‘goes wrong’; so that our 
implied or assumed meanings or ascriptions 
fail to receive support from the context or 
events.  Knowledge is then a human construct 
that arises from our actions as social beings 
producing and reproducing social systems 
against the capacities and constraints afforded 
by social structures.  It also provides a resource 
for those actions. 
All of this has extensive ramifications 
for IS.  The IS research trajectory has to 
contend with the activities of knowledgeable 
social actors and their stocks of knowledge.  
Research and investigation cannot be 
undertaken on the assumption that people can 
simply be questioned, counted and processed; 
but neither can it be undertaken on the basis 
that they can simply be observed and recorded.  
The IS agenda has to involve engagement and 
collaborative construction, involving both the 
participants and the researchers.  GTM 
presents an approach that directs researchers to 
consider any selected research context as 
problematic and non-obvious.  A challenge 
that can only be met with a contribution from 
the social actors involved with the context, but 
which cannot be wholly or ultimately reliant 
on participants’ own accounts.  The techniques 
the non-positivist practitioners of GTM apply 
and exemplify offer a range of heuristics and 
guidelines for the conduct of such research.  If 
we can become aware of the philosophical 
contradictions and methodological 
inconsistencies of GTM, and move beyond 
them to a clearer view of the strengths it offers, 
then our own IS research will yield richer 
results, and some of the scepticism concerning 
GTM should start to dissipate. 
We also have to engage with issues 
such as those raised by Flood - boundaries and 
judgements of relevance.  As Baszanger & 
Dodier argue, GTM offers a basis for doing 
this, since it provides researchers with a series 
of exemplars for developing research with 
these objectives and constraints clearly in 
mind; but where the topic of research is non-
codified and disparate, having to take people’s 
perceptions and beliefs into account.  In this 
sense Turner is correct to note that ‘there is no 
orthodoxy in grounded theory, and I do not 
think that it is necessary or desirable that such 
an orthodoxy should develop.’ (p 347)  He 
concurs with Glaser’s contention that GTM is 
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an approach that develops through activities 
best ‘expressed as a gerund:  negotiating, 
encountering, complaining’:  To which might 
be added understanding, engaging, 
challenging and contesting. 
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